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1. Introduction 
 
 Conditional independence of observations is a common requirement for well-behaved 
estimation with relatively simple estimators, such as simple maximum likelihood without 
any dynamic relationship between observations now and observations in the past. For 
naturally occurring data (such as most survey data), there is a well-founded concern that 
sequences of decisions made by the same observational unit are probably not conditionally 
independent of one another, and much econometric innovation addresses this problem.  
 Are similar concerns appropriate for laboratory data arising from a sequence of 
decisions made by the same subject in an individual choice experiment? This is an 
interesting and, to my knowledge, unexplored question. Much innovation of laboratory 
methods, based closely on decision-theoretic notions of independence, has taken place over 
the last forty years. The decision-theoretic design of laboratory mechanisms, such as the 
random problem selection or RPS mechanism, proceeds from decision theoretic 
independence axioms of various kinds. When an experimenter employs such mechanisms, 
she means to make a choice now “independent” of decision problems her subject has 
already encountered in the laboratory session, but in a decision-theoretic sense of the word 
“independence.”  
 A long history of experimental work (beginning perhaps with Starmer and Sugden 
1991 and continuing through Brown and Healy 2018) examines these decision-theoretic 
senses of independence (or as Brown and Healy wish to frame this, the statewise 
monotonicity axiom discussed by Azrieli et al. 2018). In statistical terms, that long 
experimental literature focused on the behavior of marginal choice probabilities within a 
mechanism, asking whether the presence or absence of other decision problems (within 
the mechanism) affected observed choice proportions in a given decision problem.  
 The econometric and statistical sense of the term “conditional independence” concerns 
conditional, not marginal, choice probabilities. Yet decision-theoretic axioms such as the 
compound independence axiom or CIA of expected utility and other theories, or the 
statewise monotonicity axiom, do suggest that, in sequences of decision problems 
embedded within the RPS mechanism, a choice now should not only be independent of 
previous decision problems but also independent of previous choices. Therefore I ask 
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whether or not conditional independence (in its econometric and statistical sense) appears 
to be satisfied in a state-of-the-art decision making experiment. Such experiments employ 
the RPS mechanism as well as other features that seem necessary to obtain an empirical 
version of decision theoretic independence (which I define shortly and call behavioral 
incentive compatibility or BIC).  
 Related work by Hey and Lee (2005a, 2005b) and Hey and Zhou (2014) tests whether 
subjects appear to be optimizing one grand function of all decisions across all or some trials 
(a sufficient condition for conditional dependence) and those tests suggest that subjects 
are not doing that. But conditional dependence could arise from other sources such as 
autocorrelated random preference parameter processes. The tests of Hey and Lee, and Hey 
and Zhou, also depend on assumed structural models of risk preference. The test I conduct 
here will depend on an identifying restriction, but make no assumptions concerning any 
specific underlying preference structure. 
 Within the limits of the experiment’s identifying restriction and designed power to 
detect deviations from conditional independence, conditional independence is not rejected. 
A substantial number of scholars may breathe a sigh of relief at this since it has been very 
common practice to assume conditional independence when constructing likelihood 
functions for the estimation and analysis of structural preferences from laboratory data 
(e.g. Hey and Orme 1994; Loomes et al. 2002; Andersen et al. 2008; Rieskamp 2008; Wilcox 
2008, 2011). My experimental results here suggest this has not been mistaken practice. 
 
2. Definition of an experiment and features of contemporary state-of-the-art experiments 
 
 Here an experiment ℰ = 〈Ω1
𝑖 , Ω2
𝑖 , … , Ω𝐽
𝑖 〉 means a sequence of trials 𝑗 = {1,2, … , 𝐽} 
where each subject 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝐼} chooses from a basic pair Ω𝑗
𝑖 = {𝑅𝑗
𝑖, 𝑆𝑗
𝑖} of lotteries. Let 
𝑐𝑗
𝑖 = 1 if subject 𝑖 chooses 𝑅𝑗
𝑖 from Ω𝑗
𝑖 and 𝑐𝑗
𝑖 = 0 if she chooses 𝑆𝑗
𝑖 from Ω𝑗
𝑖. A lottery 𝑅𝑗  
means a one-stage probability distribution (𝑟𝑙𝑗, 𝑟𝑚𝑗 , 𝑟ℎ𝑗) over a vector (𝑙𝑗 , 𝑚𝑗 , ℎ𝑗) of three 
possible money outcomes 𝑧 ∈ ℝ+ where 𝑙𝑗 < 𝑚𝑗 < ℎ𝑗 . A one-stage probability distribution 
is a probability measure of three exhaustive and mutually exclusive events, determined by 
one (and only one) simple random device such as a single throw of a six-sided die (as 
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employed in my experiment). This rules out resolution of uncertainty by means of a 
sequence of two or more simple random devices (it rules out multi-stage probability 
distributions). By a basic pair Ω𝑗 = {𝑅𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗} of lotteries, I mean a pair where neither lottery 
first-order stochastically dominates the other. Henceforth a pair always means a basic pair. 
 Within each pair Ω𝑗 = {𝑅𝑗 , 𝑆𝑗}, 𝑅𝑗  is relatively risky compared to the relatively safe 𝑆𝑗 , 
meaning 𝑠𝑚𝑗 > 𝑟𝑚𝑗 , 𝑟𝑙𝑗 > 𝑠𝑙𝑗, and  𝑟ℎ𝑗 > 𝑠ℎ𝑗: 𝑅𝑗  has higher probabilities of the low and high 
outcomes 𝑙𝑗  and ℎ𝑗 , while 𝑆𝑗  has a higher probability of the middle outcome 𝑚𝑗 . This 
conventional terminology is only descriptive (it carries no normative implication).  
 In an experiment, each page (in the case of a physical booklet presentation) or each 
screen (in the case of a computer presentation) presents exactly one pair: Call this feature 
separated decisions or SED. An experiment also features the random problem selection or 
RPS mechanism to motivate subjects without creating unwanted portfolio or wealth effects 
across the trial sequence. After all 𝐽 choices have been made by subject 𝑖, a random device 
selects just one trial 𝑗∗ (every trial has an equal 𝐽−1 chance of selection). Then subject 𝑖 
plays out only her chosen lottery in trial 𝑗∗ using a second random device, and this is her 
sole payment from her choices. Subjects may also receive a fixed payment simply for 
showing up on time for an experiment but this is not connected to the choices they make.  
 Under either the compound independence axiom (CIA) of expected utility and other 
theories (Segal 1990), the isolation effect of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979), or the statewise monotonicity axiom defined by Azrieli et al. (2018), experiments 
featuring RPS should achieve what I call behavioral incentive compatibility or BIC. Consider 
a 𝐽 pair experiment ℰ = 〈Ω1
𝑖 , Ω2
𝑖 , … , Ω𝑗
𝑖, … , Ω𝐽
𝑖 〉 and a one pair experiment ℰ° = 〈Ω1°
𝑖 〉 where 
Ω1°
𝑖 ≡ Ω𝑗
𝑖 are the same pair: BIC holds iff 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑅1°
𝑖 ), where 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) ≡ 𝑃(𝑐𝑗
𝑖 = 1) is the 
marginal probability that subject 𝑖 chooses 𝑅𝑗
𝑖 from Ω𝑗
𝑖. Put differently, BIC holds when the 
choice probability 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) in a 𝐽 pair experiment equals the choice probability 𝑃(𝑅1°
𝑖 ) in an 
experiment presenting only that pair.  
 Current evidence fails to reject BIC when all alternatives are lotteries in basic pairs and 
the experiment features both SED and RPS (Brown and Healy 2018 show this and discuss 
past evidence). Baltussen et al. 2012 show that BIC can fail when trials are not choices from 
lottery pairs (in particular, where each trial is a sequence of decisions in a multi-stage risky 
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choice game); and both Harrison and Swarthout (2014) and Cox et al. (2015) show that 
BIC can fail without SED. Therefore my new experiment features lotteries in basic pairs, 
SED, and RPS, which I regard as the current “state-of-the-art” for obtaining BIC. 
 
3. Purpose of the new experiment 
 
 When we write probabilities 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) of choice events to build likelihood functions for 
preference estimation, these obviously condition on offered pairs. The simplest model 
𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) = 𝑓𝑖(Ω𝑗
𝑖) only conditions on the offered pair and the subject. This conditional 
independence assumption greatly simplifies construction of the likelihood of a choice 
sequence 𝑐𝑖 = (𝑐1
𝑖 , 𝑐2
𝑖 , … , 𝑐𝐽
𝑖) and minimizes the number of parameters to be estimated. 
Behavioral economists (and psychologists) widely make this assumption for likelihood-
based analysis of choice sequences (e.g. Hey and Orme 1994; Loomes et al. 2002; Andersen 
et al. 2008; Rieskamp 2008; Wilcox 2008, 2011). In general choices may be conditionally 
dependent: True choice probabilities would then be 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) = 𝑔𝑖(Ω𝑗
𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗−1
𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗−2
𝑖 , … , 𝑐1
𝑖 ) ≢
𝑓𝑖(Ω𝑗
𝑖). Here, I test the null hypothesis of conditional independence against an alternative 
hypothesis of restricted conditional dependence 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) = 𝑔𝑖(Ω𝑗
𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗−1
𝑖 ) that informs my 
experimental design, power planning (detailed in the Appendix), and data analysis. 
 Henceforth I suppress explicit conditioning on Ω𝑗
𝑖, taking it as implicit that all choice 
probabilities are conditioned on the offered pair. Thus 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖|𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) will mean 𝑔𝑖(Ω𝑗
𝑖, 1) and 
𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖|𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) will mean 𝑔𝑖(Ω𝑗
𝑖, 0), while 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) written without any condition will mean the 
marginal probability that 𝑐𝑗
𝑖 = 1 given that subject 𝑖 chooses from pair Ω𝑗
𝑖. 
 
4. Design of this experiment 
 
 Let 𝑡 and 𝜏 ∈ {1,2, … ,50} index two sequences of 50 choice pairs, the 𝑡 sequence (with 
pairs indexed by 𝑡) and the 𝜏 sequence (with pairs indexed by 𝜏). The design presents each 
subject with these two sequences, for 𝐽 = 100 total choice pairs. The order of presentation 
of the 𝑡 and 𝜏 sequences is varied across subjects: Let 𝒪1 and 𝒪2 denote sets of subjects 𝑖 
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who received the 𝑡 sequence or 𝜏 sequence first, respectively. The two sequences are 
separated by a short unpaid survey (as described below, the survey just gives subjects a 
short break between the sequences; responses to survey questions are of no interest here). 
 Both sequences contain 12 target pairs  𝒯 = {10,13,16,19,22,25,28,31,34,37,40,43} in 
exactly the same place within each sequence, for a test  and (fifty pairs later) a retest of 
choice from each target pair. Target pairs are identical across the two sequences. For 
example target pairs 𝑡 = 10 and 𝜏 = 10 are exactly the same choice pair. 
 Conditioning pairs  {9,12,15,18,21,24,27,30,33,36,39,42} immediately precede each 
target pair. These pairs differ across the 𝑡 and 𝜏 sequences. For example, conditioning pairs 
𝑡 = 9 and 𝜏 = 9 (presented just before the common target pair 𝑡 = 𝜏 = 10) are different 
choice pairs: In pair 𝑡 = 9, 𝑅𝑡 is more attractive than 𝑆𝑡 (call this a high conditioning pair) 
for most subjects, while in pair 𝜏 = 9 𝑆𝜏 is more attractive than 𝑅𝜏(call this a low 
conditioning pair)  for most subjects. This manipulation makes it likely that any subject 
comes to the two presentations of identical target pair 𝑡 = 𝜏 = 10 with two different choice 
histories (different choices at 𝑡 = 𝜏 = 9). Similarly for each 𝑡 = 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯 a high conditioning 
pair immediately precedes 𝑡 or 𝜏 while a low conditioning pair immediately precedes the 
other matched target pair. Table 1 shows that this manipulation was largely successful. 
 
Table 1: Choice percentages (of 204 subjects) in conditioning pairs 
 
high conditioning pairs meant to 
induce choice of 𝑅 (risky) 
 low conditioning pairs meant to 
induce choice of 𝑆 (safe) 
pair 
index 
 percentage 
𝑅 (risky) 
 
 
pair 
index 
 percentage 
𝑆 (safe) 
𝑡 = 9  81.37  𝑡 = 12  87.75 
𝑡 = 15  79.90  𝑡 = 18  83.82 
𝑡 = 21  90.20  𝑡 = 24  92.65 
𝑡 = 27  84.80  𝑡 = 30  90.69 
𝑡 = 33  90.69  𝑡 = 36  99.02 
𝑡 = 39  78.92  𝑡 = 42  87.75 
𝜏 = 12  88.24  𝜏 = 9  68.63 
𝜏 = 18  92.65  𝜏 = 15  77.45 
𝜏 = 24  92.16  𝜏 = 21  95.10 
𝜏 = 30  88.73  𝜏 = 27  65.20 
𝜏 = 36  91.67  𝜏 = 33  87.75 
𝜏 = 42  87.75  𝜏 = 39  86.76 
average 87.26  average 85.21 
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 Figure 1 illustrates the overall trial sequence in the experiment. Notice the additional 
presence of buffer pairs which serve several design purposes. First, a buffer pair separates 
each pair of a conditioning and target pair from the next such pair of pairs (see panel B of 
Figure 1). Second, both the 𝑡 and 𝜏 sequences begin and end with seven buffer pairs. This 
gives subjects a (short) warm-up prior to presentation of pairs of conditioning and target 
pairs and additionally keeps these away from the ends of sequences (when subjects might 
begin relaxing their concentration). Appendix Table A1 lists all of the choice pairs, and this 
online supplement contains screen prints of the experiment’s computerized instructions. 
 
 
Figure 1: The experiment sequence for the subjects 𝑖 ∈ 𝒪1 (receiving the 𝑡 sequence first). 
 
 
A. Pair sequence 
 
 
 
 
1, 2, 3, ⋯, 𝑗, ⋯, 49, 50  
survey 
 51, 52, 53, ⋯, 𝑗, ⋯, 99, 100 
                  
1, 2, 3, ⋯, 𝑡, ⋯, 49, 50   1, 2, 3, ⋯, 𝜏, ⋯, 49, 50 
     
the 𝑡 sequence of choice pairs    the 𝜏 sequence of choice pairs 
 
 
B. Pair sequence detail 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⋯, 8 9 10 ⋯,  survey  ⋯, 8 9 10 ⋯, 
 
             
 
 
 
 
the 𝑡 sequence    the 𝜏 sequence 
 
target pairs 𝑡 = 𝜏 = 10: same pair in both sequences 
conditioning pair 𝑡 = 9 conditioning pair 𝜏 = 9 
buffer pair 𝑡 = 8 buffer pair 𝜏 = 8 
time 
pairs differ 
pairs differ 
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5. Hypotheses and data analysis 
 
 In eqs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 below I index pairs by locations 𝑗 = 𝑘 = 𝑚 ∈ 𝒯, with exactly one of 
𝑗 or 𝑘 in the 𝑡 sequence and the other in the 𝜏 sequence. That is, both 𝑗 and 𝑘 are the same 
target pair location 𝑚, one in the 𝑡 sequence and the other in the 𝜏 sequence and, for the 
time being, which is which remains unspecified. The experimental design implies that one 
of 𝑗 or 𝑘 follows a high conditioning pair while the other follows a low conditioning pair. 
With all this in mind, conditionally independent and identically distributed trials imply that  
 
(1)  𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) 𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 )⁄ ≡ 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖|𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑅𝑘
𝑖 |𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 ) ≡ 𝑃(𝑅𝑘
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 ) 𝑃(𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 )⁄ . 
 
Rearrange the left-most and right-most terms of eq. 1 to get the null hypothesis  
 
(2)  𝐻0:  𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 )𝑃(𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 ) − 𝑃(𝑅𝑘
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 )𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) = 0. 
 
 To test this null, define these twelve data-derived within-subject differences for each 
subject 𝑖: 
 
(3)  𝑦𝑚
𝑖 = 𝟏(𝑐𝑗
𝑖 = 1 ∩ 𝑐𝑗−1
𝑖 = 1) ∙ 𝟏(𝑐𝑘−1
𝑖 = 0) − 𝟏(𝑐𝑘
𝑖 = 1 ∩ 𝑐𝑘−1
𝑖 = 0) ∙ 𝟏(𝑐𝑗−1
𝑖 = 1). 
 
 Adopt the indexing convention that, when it is possible to do so, the target pair indices 
𝑗 and 𝑘 are assigned to the 𝑡 and 𝜏 sequences so that 𝑐𝑗−1
𝑖 = 1 and 𝑐𝑘−1
𝑖 = 0. (Notice that 
whenever this is not possible, 𝑦𝑚
𝑖 = 0 regardless of the assignment of those indices.) The 
design’s conditioning pair features are meant to make (𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 ) a likely event in the 
data for  𝑗 = 𝑘 = 𝑚 ∈ 𝒯. Table 2 shows the experiment’s joint distributions of safe and 
risky choices in pairs of high and low conditioning pairs: The sum of the off-diagonal cells 
in these tables give the percent of subjects for whom 𝑗 and 𝑘 can be assigned such that 
events (𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 ) occur and shows that these are common in the data, as intended. 
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Table 2: Empirical joint distribution of choices in high and low conditioning pairs 
(percentages of 204 subjects). 
 
   low conditioning pair choice 
   safe risky  safe risky  safe risky 
        
  
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 9 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 12 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 15 
 safe 11.76 6.86 
 
9.80 1.96 
 
15.20 4.90 
 risky  56.86 24.51 
 
77.94 10.29 
 
62.25 17.65 
         
  
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 18 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 21 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 24 
 safe 7.35 0.00 
 
9.80 0.00 
 
7.35 0.49 
high 
conditioning 
pair choice 
risky  76.47 16.18 
 
85.29 4.90 
 
85.29 6.86 
        
 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 27 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 30 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 33 
 safe 14.71 0.49 
 
9.80 1.47 
 
8.33 0.98 
 risky  50.49 34.31 
 
80.88 7.84 
 
79.41 11.27 
         
  
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 36 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 39 
 
𝑡 = 𝜏 = 42 
 safe 8.33 0.00 
 
18.14 2.94 
 
10.78 1.47 
 risky  90.69 0.98 
 
68.63 10.29 
 
76.96 10.78 
         
 
 
 To know the expected value of each 𝑦𝑚
𝑖 , I need an identifying restriction: 
 
Identifying Restriction:  𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖  and 𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖  are conditionally independent, and 
𝑅𝑘
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖  and 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖  are conditionally independent.  
 
This identifying restriction is implied by both the null and alternative hypotheses. Beyond 
the specifics of the null and alternative hypotheses, the restriction requires that at a 
remove of fifty trials there is no dependence between the test and the retest of the same 
target pair and the conditioning pairs preceding them. The design’s survey break between 
the 𝑡 and 𝜏 sequences is meant to enhance the plausibility of this “no memory” assumption 
between the two sequences. Under this assumed restriction,  
 
(4)   𝐸[𝑦𝑚
𝑖 ] = 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 )𝑃(𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 ) − 𝑃(𝑅𝑘
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑘−1
𝑖 )𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ). 
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Therefore, defining the observation from each subject 𝑖 as 𝑦𝑖 =
1
12
∑ 𝑦𝑚
𝑖
𝑚∈𝒯 , a one-sample 
test against a zero location of the 𝑦𝑖 tests the null of eq. 2 against the alternative of 
conditional dependence.  
 Given the construction of 𝑦𝑖 detailed above (especially the indexing  convention), 
nonzero values of 𝑦𝑖 are evidence favoring one of two alternatives. When 𝑦𝑖 > 0, relatively 
risky choices are more common when preceded by a relatively risky choice than when 
preceded by a relatively safe choice: On average we observe persistence of the choices of 
subject 𝑖. When 𝑦𝑖 < 0, relatively risky choices are less common when preceded by a 
relatively risky choice than when preceded by a relatively safe choice: On average we 
observe alternation of the choices by subject 𝑖.  
 A simple one-parameter odds ratio model of conditional dependence (e.g. Lipsitz et al. 
1991; Carey et al. 1993) captures both possibilities (persistence or alternation) and this 
model motivated the experimental design and informed my power analysis of the design. 
The Appendix contains that power analysis, which is for a two-tailed t-test against the null 
hypothesis of eq. 2, at a size of 5%, given effect sizes described in the Appendix. To obtain 
power of 90%, the analysis recommends a sample size of 200 subjects. The actual sample 
size is 204 subjects 𝑖, with half in the 𝒪1 pair ordering and the other half in the 𝒪2 ordering. 
 The above construction of the null hypothesis and the observation 𝑦𝑖 for testing it 
assumes not only conditional independence but identically distributed trials of target pair 
choices  across the 𝑡 and 𝜏 sequences. The design’s balanced variation of presentation order 
of the 𝑡 and 𝜏 sequences should offset any simple drift toward either more risky or more 
safe choices as trials progress. However, simple drift is a finding of some experiments (e.g. 
Hey and Orme 1994; Ballinger and Wilcox 1997; Loomes and Sugden 1998) so to check for 
it define the observation 
  
(5)  𝑥𝑖 =  
1
12
[𝟏(𝑖𝜖𝒪1) ∑ (𝑐𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑐𝜏
𝑖 )𝑡=𝜏∈𝒯 + 𝟏(𝑖𝜖𝒪2) ∑ (𝑐𝜏
𝑖 − 𝑐𝑡
𝑖)𝑡=𝜏∈𝒯 ], 
 
which is just the difference between observed risky choices of subject 𝑖 in her first and 
second trials of target pairs. Figure 2 displays the empirical cumulative distribution 
function of 𝑥𝑖  across the experiment’s 204 subjects. The sample mean of 𝑥𝑖  and that mean’s   
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Figure 2: Empirical cumulative distribution function of 𝑥𝑖  across 204 subjects. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Empirical cumulative distribution function of 𝑦𝑖 across 204 subjects. 
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standard error are –0.0041 and 0.0093, respectively, suggesting an absence of significant 
simple drift in the new experiment. 
 Figure 3 displays the empirical cumulative distribution function of 𝑦𝑖 across the 
experiment’s 204 subjects. The sample mean of 𝑦𝑖 and that mean’s standard error are 
0.0069 and 0.0084, respectively, yielding a 𝑡-statistic with absolute value less than one, so 
there is no significant violation of conditional independence in the new experiment. The 
statistic is positive, suggesting that if there is any conditional dependence here, it is 
perhaps a bit of persistence of choice. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 It appears that when an experimenter uses state-of-the-art experimental mechanisms 
and features in an individual choice experiment, conditional independence of observed 
choices is an acceptable assumption. To my knowledge, the new experiment reported here 
is the first direct test of conditional independence, though the tests reported by Hey and 
Lee (2005a, 2005b) and Hey and Zhou (2014) certainly weigh in favor of conditional 
independence as well. And perhaps this does not need emphasis, but neither my evidence 
nor that of Hey and his co-authors says anything at all about other decision experiments 
where choice problems are not basic pairs of one-stage lotteries, or RPS and SED are not 
features of the experiment. Nor does this evidence say anything about other sorts of 
experiments such as multiperiod games or markets. Other scholars could investigate the 
status of conditional independence in these other kinds of experiments. 
 My data analysis and experimental design depended on two things: First, no drift in 
choice probabilities across the two trials of my target choice pairs (which appears to be 
empirically acceptable); and second, an identifying restriction—in essence that at a remove 
of about fifty intervening trials there is no conditional dependence. I have no test of that 
assumption, but believe it is defensible. The two oldest facts from human memory research 
are the primacy and recency effects. The recency effect suggests that if there is any 
conditional dependence, we should probably expect to detect it in recently past choices 
(say one or two trials ago) rather than at a remove of fifty trials past. The primacy effect is 
12 
 
that the earliest events or stimuli in a sequence are more likely to be remembered. My 
experimental design pads the front end of each choice sequence (the earliest trials, most 
exposed to any primacy effect) with seven buffer pairs not used in my test. However, I 
accept that there is room for doubt about my identifying restriction. 
 Behavioral econometricians and psychometricians frequently assume conditional 
independence when they construct their likelihood functions for structural estimation of 
preferences from discrete choice sequences observed in the lab. They may take some 
comfort from my results—assuming, of course, that their experiment employs RPS, and 
SED, and that their subjects’ choices are from pairs of one-stage lotteries. For the rest, we 
await new experiments testing conditional independence in other experimental situations. 
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Appendix 
 
 An odds ratio model (Lipsitz et al. 1991; Carey et al. 1993) of restricted conditional 
dependence guided my power analysis for designing the experiment: 
 
Constant odds ratio of four joint probabilities parameterized by the constant 𝛾 > 0: 
 
(A1) 𝛾 = 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) ∙ 𝑃(𝑆𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) [𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) ∙ 𝑃(𝑆𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 )]⁄ > 0. 
 
The four joint probabilities add up to unity (probability theory identity): 
 
(A2) 1 = 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) + 𝑃(𝑆𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) +  𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) + 𝑃(𝑆𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ). 
 
Pairs of joint probabilities add up to marginal probabilities (probability theory identities): 
 
(A3) 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) + 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 )  and 
(A4) 𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) + 𝑃(𝑆𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ). 
 
 With given values of 𝛾, 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖), and 𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) in hand, Eqs. A1 to A4 imply the following 
quadratic equation in 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ): 
 
(A5) (𝛾 − 1)[𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 )]
2
+ 𝛼𝑗
𝑖𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝑗
𝑖 = 0,  where 
  𝛼𝑗
𝑖 = (1 − 𝛾)[𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) + 𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 )] − 1  and  𝛽𝑗
𝑖 = 𝛾𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) ∙ 𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ). 
 
When 𝛾 ≠ 1, the quadratic formula gives roots of this equation. Only one root is well-
behaved in the sense that the solution 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) is always in [0,1]  ∀ 𝛾 ≠ 1): It is 
 
(A6) 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) = − 0.5 ∙ (𝛼𝑗
𝑖 + [(𝛼𝑗
𝑖)
2
− 4(𝛾 − 1)𝛽𝑗
𝑖]
0.5
) (𝛾 − 1)−1 ∀ 𝛾 ≠ 1,  and   
  𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) ∙ 𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 )  for  𝛾 = 1. 
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The solution from eq. A6 allows a sequential solution for the other three joint probabilities 
using eqs. A2, A3 and A4: 
 
(A7) 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) − 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ), 
(A8) 𝑃(𝑆𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) − 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ), and 
(A9) 𝑃(𝑆𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) − 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) − 𝑃(𝑆𝑗
𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ). 
 
 In turn, with given values of 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖) and 𝑃(𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) in hand, Eqs. A6 and A7 then give 
solutions for the key conditional probabilities 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖|𝑅𝑗−1
𝑖 ) and 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑖|𝑆𝑗−1
𝑖 ) given any value of 
𝛾 one wishes to specify as an interesting alternative hypothesis. The upper panels of 
Figures A1 and A2 graph these conditional probabilities for a 𝑡 = 𝜏 ∈ 𝒯 target pair where 
𝑡 − 1 is a high conditioning pair with 𝑃(𝑅𝑡−1
𝑖 ) = 0.85 and 𝜏 − 1 is a low conditioning pair 
with 𝑃(𝑆𝜏−1
𝑖 ) = 0.85 (approximately reflecting the average results for conditioning pairs 
shown in Table 1). Figure A1 assumes that 𝛾 = 2 yielding persistence so that 𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖|𝑅𝑡−1
𝑖 ) −
𝑃(𝑅𝜏
𝑖 |𝑆𝜏−1
𝑖 ) > 0 at any common marginal probability 𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑅𝜏
𝑖 ) (shown on the 
horizontal axis).  Figure A2 instead assumes that 𝛾 = 0.5 yielding alternation so that 
𝑃(𝑅𝜏
𝑖 |𝑆𝜏−1
𝑖 ) − 𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖|𝑅𝑡−1
𝑖 ) > 0 at any common marginal probability 𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑅𝜏
𝑖 ). 
 The lower panels of Figures A1 and A2 graph corresponding effect sizes. For example, 
to draw the lower panel of Figure A1, one divides the difference 𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖|𝑅𝑡−1
𝑖 ) − 𝑃(𝑅𝜏
𝑖 |𝑆𝜏−1
𝑖 ) 
under the alternative hypothesis 𝛾 = 2 by the standard deviation (2𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖)[1 − 𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖)])
0.5
 of 
that difference under the null hypothesis that 𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖|𝑅𝑡−1
𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑅𝜏
𝑖 |𝑆𝜏−1
𝑖 ) =  𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖) (which is 
𝛾 = 1). The figures reveal that these effect sizes are on the small side. Cohen’s (1988) 
convention for these kinds of effect sizes calls 0.2 and 0.5 small and medium effect sizes, 
and those in the figures never quite reach 0.25 regardless of the common marginal 
probability 𝑃(𝑅𝑡
𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑅𝜏
𝑖 ). This is one reason for the repeated measurement of the design 
(that is, why there are twelve pairs of target and conditioning pairs in each sequence, 
providing twelve values 𝑦𝑚
𝑖  which are then averaged within each subject to yield overall 
observations 𝑦𝑖 for each subject 𝑖). 
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Figure A1. Conditional probabilities and effect size implied by 𝑃(𝑅𝑡−1
𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑆𝜏−1
𝑖 ) = 0.85 
and persistence (𝛾 = 2). 
 
 
 
 The figures also reveal an asymmetry relevant to the experimental design. Under the 
alternative hypothesis of persistence (𝛾 = 2) the range of marginal probabilities achieving 
effect sizes of at least 0.2 is about 0.30 to 0.85. But under the alternative hypothesis of 
alternation (𝛾 = 0.5), the range of marginal probabilities achieving effect sizes of at least 
0.2 is about 0.15 to 0.70. The compromise range most useful for both alternative 
hypotheses is to (try to) choose target pairs with marginal probabilities in a range from 
about 0.30 to 0.70. On the other hand, some marginal probabilities outside this range are 
among those most useful for estimation of preferences (Manski and McFadden 1981; 
Kanninen 2002). In this design, I attempted to choose target pairs which, on the basis of 
past results with the population I sample from (more on this appears presently), would 
have population mean probabilities falling across most of the unit interval. Half of the  
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Figure A2. Conditional probabilities and effect size implied by 𝑃(𝑅𝑡−1
𝑖 ) = 𝑃(𝑆𝜏−1
𝑖 ) = 0.85 
and alternation (𝛾 = 0.5). 
 
 
 
twelve target pair tests and retests fall within the range from 0.30 to 0.70 mentioned 
above, with the other half more extreme. 
 An estimate of the distributions of marginal and conditional choice probabilities in the 
population I sample from helps with selecting a reasonable sample size. I have a previous 
experiment with a sample of 501 undergraduate subjects from my university, each 
choosing from 72 lottery pairs on the outcome range $8 to $48, using a 4-sided die as the 
chance device. This unpublished experiment was completed in January 2010 in 
collaboration with the late John Dickhaut. Using this data and assuming conditional 
independence, I estimated a random parameters Rank Dependent Utility or RDU model 
(Quiggin 1982, 1993). RDU is essentially the same as Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) 
Cumulative Prospect Theory limited to lotteries over gains. This yields an estimated 
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distribution of preference parameter vectors 𝜃 in the population of likely subjects at my 
university.  
 With this estimation completed, I draw 1000 simulated subjects indexed by 
𝑛 ∈ {1,2, … ,1000} from my estimated distribution of RDU parameters, and for design 
planning purposes I regard these 1000 simulated subjects as “the population” I sample 
from when I run an experiment. Each simulated subject is a vector 𝜃𝑛 = (𝜅𝑛, 𝜇𝑛, 𝜔𝑛, 𝜆𝑛) of 
four probabilistic RDU model parameters described below. 
 The parameter  𝜅𝑛 ∈ ℝ  is utility curvature in this HARA utility function: 
 
(A10) 𝑢(𝑧|𝜅𝑠) = (1 − 𝜅𝑛)−1[−1 + (1 + 𝑧)(1−𝜅
𝑛)]  for  𝜅𝑛 ≠ 1,  ln (1 + 𝑧)  for  𝜅𝑛 = 1. 
 
The parameters  𝜇𝑛 ∈ (0,1)  and  𝜔𝑛 ∈ (0, ∞)  are elevation and curvature parameters of 
this “Beta” weighting function: 
 
(A11) 𝑤(𝐺|𝜇𝑛, 𝜔𝑛) = 𝐵(𝐺|𝑎𝑛, 𝑏𝑛)  where  𝑎𝑛 = 𝜇𝑛𝜔𝑛,  𝑏𝑛 = (1 − 𝜇𝑛)𝜔𝑛,  
  𝐺 is decumulative probability in a lottery, and  
  𝐵(𝑥|𝑎𝑛, 𝑏𝑛) is the cumulative distribution function of the Beta distribution. 
 
The parameter  𝜆𝑛 ∈ (0, ∞)  is a precision or sensitivity parameter of the probabilistic RDU 
model of choice I use in the random parameters estimation.  
 
 The RDU model of marginal probabilities is then 
 
(A12) 𝑃(𝑅𝑗
𝑛|𝜃𝑛) = Λ(𝜆𝑛∆𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑗
𝑛)  where  ∆𝑅𝐷𝑈𝑗
𝑛 = 𝑅𝐷𝑈(𝑅𝑗
𝑛) − 𝑅𝐷𝑈(𝑆𝑗
𝑛), 
  Λ(𝑥) = [1 + exp (𝑥)]−1 is the logistic cumulative distribution function, 
  𝑅𝐷𝑈(𝑅𝑗
𝑛) =  𝜋ℎ𝑗(𝜇
𝑛, 𝜔𝑛) + 𝜋𝑚𝑗(𝜇
𝑛, 𝜔𝑛)𝑣𝑗(𝑚𝑗|𝜅
𝑛), 
  𝜋ℎ𝑗(𝜇
𝑠, 𝜔𝑠) = 𝑤(𝑟ℎ𝑗|𝜇
𝑛, 𝜔𝑛),  𝜋𝑚𝑗(𝜇
𝑛, 𝜔𝑛) = 𝑤(𝑟ℎ𝑗 + 𝑟𝑚𝑗|𝜇
𝑛, 𝜔𝑛) − 𝑤(𝑟ℎ𝑗|𝜇
𝑛, 𝜔𝑛),  
  and  𝑣𝑗(𝑚𝑗|𝜅
𝑛) = [𝑢(𝑚𝑗|𝜅
𝑛) − 𝑢(𝑙𝑗|𝜅
𝑛)] [𝑢(ℎ𝑗|𝜅
𝑛) − 𝑢(𝑙𝑗|𝜅
𝑛)]⁄ . 
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 This specification of marginal RDU choice probabilities employs the contextual utility 
probabilistic choice model of Wilcox (2008, 2011) which is appropriate for three-outcome 
pairs of lotteries. These marginal probabilities, calculated for all 𝐽 = 100 pairs in the design 
for each of the 1000 simulated subjects 𝑛, are the choice probabilities under the null 
hypothesis 𝛾 = 1. Conditional choice probabilities may be calculated from them by way of 
eqs. A6 and A7 for any assumed value of 𝛾 ≠ 1, providing choice probabilities under any 
alternative hypothesis.   
 Monte Carlo simulation can check the size of potential test statistics using the marginal 
probabilities (i.e. those that apply when the null hypothesis 𝛾 = 1 is true) as true choice 
probabilities. I draw 10,000 samples, each with 𝑁 = 200 simulated subjects, from my 
population of simulated subjects. For each of those simulated subjects, I draw 100 
Bernoulli variates 𝑐𝑗
𝑛 based on their marginal choice probability as given by eq. A12. Then 
𝑦𝑛 may be computed for each of the 200 simulated subjects in each sample, and then one 
may compute (in each sample) the p-values of test statistics against the null hypothesis in 
eq. 2. For a nominal size of 5%, the actual size of t-tests, signed-rank tests, and sign tests 
from this Monte Carlo simulation are 5.06%, 5.15% and 4.12%, respectively. As far as size 
goes, both the t-tests and the signed-rank tests look quite good, whereas the sign tests 
appear to be somewhat conservative. 
 Monte Carlo simulation can also check the power of potential test statistics, at various 
sample sizes, using the conditional probabilities (i.e. those that apply when the alternative 
hypotheses with 𝛾 ≠ 1 are true) as true choice probabilities. I draw 10,000 samples, each 
with 𝑁 = 200 simulated subjects, from my population of simulated subjects. For each of 
those simulated subjects, eq. A12 is first used to compute marginal probabilities, and then 
eqs. A6 and A7 are used to convert these into conditional probabilities with some 𝛾 ≠ 1. I 
draw 100 Bernoulli variates 𝑐𝑗
𝑛 based on those conditional choice probabilities and the 
previous draw at 𝑗 − 1 (each draw 𝑐𝑗−1
𝑛  determines the conditional choice probability used 
to draw 𝑐𝑗
𝑛). Then 𝑦𝑛 may be computed for each of the 200 simulated subjects in each 
sample, and then one may compute (in each sample) the p-values of test statistics against 
the null hypothesis in eq. 2.  
21 
 
 When 𝛾 = 2 (the value of 𝛾 I specify for the alternative hypothesis of persistence), at a 
nominal size of 5% and with 𝑁 = 200 simulated subjects per sample, t-tests, signed-rank 
tests, and sign tests reject the null hypothesis in  89.71%, 89.20% and 81.20% of the 
10,000 samples, respectively. These power figures show that both the t-tests and the 
signed-rank tests get very close to 90% power with 𝑁 = 200, whereas the sign tests are 
noticeably less powerful than that. The alternative hypothesis of alternation (I specify 
𝛾 = 0.5 for this) produces very similar results. The t-tests, signed-rank tests, and sign tests 
reject the null hypothesis in  90.37%, 90.13% and 81.78% of the 10,000 samples, 
respectively. Again, both the t-tests and the signed-rank tests get very close to 90% power 
with 𝑁 = 200, whereas the sign tests are noticeably less powerful than that. 
 I made the same calculations above for progressively larger samples (beginning at 
𝑁 = 100 and stepping this up in increments of 10) until the sample size produced roughly 
90% power for both 𝛾 = 2 and 𝛾 = 0.5, which first occurs at 𝑁 = 200. This is how the 
sample size was chosen. 
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Table A1: The lottery pairs. 
 
the 𝑡 sequence pairs  the 𝜏 sequence pairs 
𝑡 
 
𝑙 𝑚 ℎ 
 
𝑟𝑙  𝑟𝑚  𝑟ℎ   
𝑠𝑙  𝑠𝑚  𝑠ℎ   
pair 
type  
𝜏 
 
𝑙 𝑚 ℎ 
 
𝑟𝑙  𝑟𝑚  𝑟ℎ   
𝑠𝑙  𝑠𝑚  𝑠ℎ   
pair 
type 
1 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
 
1 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
 
 
1
3
 
2
3
 0 
 
buff 
2 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
0 
2
3
 
1
3
 
 
buff 
 
2 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
0 1 0 
 
buff 
3 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 1 0 
 
buff 
 
3 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 1 0 
 
buff 
4 
 
8 18 23 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
3
 
2
3
 0 
 
buff 
 
4 
 
8 18 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
buff 
5 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
 
5 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
6 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
buff 
 
6 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 
1
2
 
1
2
  
buff 
7 
 
18 23 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
buff 
 
7 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
buff 
8 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
 
0 1 0 
 
buff 
 
8 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 
1
2
 
1
2
  
buff 
9 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
high 
 
9 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 
1
2
 
1
2
  
low 
10 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 1 0 
 
targ 
 
10 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 1 0 
 
targ 
11 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
6
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
buff 
 
11 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
 
0 1 0 
 
buff 
12 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
low 
 
12 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 1 0 
 
high 
13 
 
8 18 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
targ 
 
13 
 
8 18 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
targ 
14 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 
1
2
 
1
2
  
buff 
 
14 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
buff 
15 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
6
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
high 
 
15 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 
1
3
 
2
3
 
 
low 
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Table A1: The lottery pairs (continued). 
 
the 𝑡 sequence pairs  the 𝜏 sequence pairs 
𝑡  𝑙 𝑚 ℎ  𝑟𝑙  𝑟𝑚  𝑟ℎ   𝑠𝑙  𝑠𝑚  𝑠ℎ   
pair 
type 
 𝜏  𝑙 𝑚 ℎ  𝑟𝑙  𝑟𝑚  𝑟ℎ   𝑠𝑙  𝑠𝑚  𝑠ℎ   
pair 
type 
16  18 23 58  
1
2
 0 
1
2
  0 
2
3
 
1
3
  targ  16  18 23 58  
1
2
 0 
1
2
  0 
2
3
 
1
3
  targ 
17 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
 
17 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
18 
 
8 18 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
 
 
low 
 
18 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
high 
19 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
targ 
 
19 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
targ 
20 
 
8 18 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
3
 
2
3
 0 
 
buff 
 
20 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
21 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
 
 
high 
 
21 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
low 
22 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 1 0 
 
targ 
 
22 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 1 0 
 
targ 
23 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
 
23 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
24 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
low 
 
24 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
 
0 1 0 
 
high 
25 
 
8 18 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
1
2
 
1
2
 0  
targ 
 
25 
 
8 18 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
1
2
 
1
2
 0  
targ 
26 
 
8 18 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
buff 
 
26 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 
1
3
 
2
3
 
 
buff 
27 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
high 
 
27 
 
8 18 23 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
1
2
 
1
2
 0  
low 
28 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
targ 
 
28 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
targ 
29 
 
8 18 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
2
3
 
1
3
 0 
 
buff 
 
29 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
30 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
 
 
low 
 
30 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
0 1 0 
 
high 
24 
 
Table A1: The lottery pairs (continued). 
 
the 𝑡 sequence pairs  the 𝜏 sequence pairs 
𝑡  𝑙 𝑚 ℎ  𝑟𝑙  𝑟𝑚  𝑟ℎ   𝑠𝑙  𝑠𝑚  𝑠ℎ   
pair 
type 
 𝜏  𝑙 𝑚 ℎ  𝑟𝑙  𝑟𝑚  𝑟ℎ   𝑠𝑙  𝑠𝑚  𝑠ℎ   
pair 
type 
31  8 18 23  
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
3
 
2
3
 0  targ  31  8 18 23  
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
3
 
2
3
 0  targ 
32  8 18 58  
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
6
  0 1 0  buff  32  8 18 58  
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
  0 
5
6
 
1
6
  buff 
33 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
high 
 
33 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 
2
3
 
1
3
 
 
low 
34 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
targ 
 
34 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
targ 
35 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 
5
6
 
1
6
 
 
buff 
 
35 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
0 1 0 
 
buff 
36 
 
8 18 23 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
6
 
 
low 
 
36 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
6
 
 
high 
37 
 
8 18 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
targ 
 
37 
 
8 18 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
targ 
38 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 
2
3
 
1
3
 
 
buff 
 
38 
 
8 18 23 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
2
 
1
2
 0  
buff 
39 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
3
 
2
3
 0 
 
high 
 
39 
 
8 18 23 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
low 
40 
 
18 23 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
targ 
 
40 
 
18 23 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
targ 
41 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
 
buff 
 
41 
 
18 23 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
1
6
 
5
6
 0  
buff 
42 
 
8 18 23 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
 
low 
 
42 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
1
6
 
1
2
 
1
3
 
 
high 
43 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
3
 
2
3
 0 
 
targ 
 
43 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
2
 0 
1
2
  
1
3
 
2
3
 0 
 
targ 
44 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
2
 
1
2
 0  
buff 
 
44 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
2
 
1
2
 0  
buff 
45 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
3
 
1
2
 
1
6
 
 
0 1 0 
 
buff 
 
45 
 
18 23 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
0 1 0 
 
buff 
25 
 
Table A1: The lottery pairs (continued). 
 
the 𝑡 sequence pairs  the 𝜏 sequence pairs 
𝑡  𝑙 𝑚 ℎ  𝑟𝑙  𝑟𝑚  𝑟ℎ   𝑠𝑙  𝑠𝑚  𝑠ℎ   
pair 
type 
 𝜏  𝑙 𝑚 ℎ  𝑟𝑙  𝑟𝑚  𝑟ℎ   𝑠𝑙  𝑠𝑚  𝑠ℎ   
pair 
type 
46  8 18 58  
1
3
 0 
2
3
  
1
6
 
5
6
 0  buff  46  18 23 58  
1
6
 0 
5
6
  0 
1
2
 
1
2
  buff 
47  8 18 23  
1
3
 0 
2
3
  0 
1
2
 
1
2
  buff  47  18 23 58  
2
3
 0 
1
3
  0 
5
6
 
1
6
  buff 
48  8 18 58  
1
3
 0 
2
3
  
1
6
 
2
3
 
1
6
  buff  48  8 18 23  
1
6
 0 
5
6
  0 1 0  buff 
49 
 
8 18 58 
 
1
6
 0 
5
6
  
0 
2
3
 
1
3
 
 
buff 
 
49 
 
18 23 58 
 
1
3
 0 
2
3
 
 
0 
2
3
 
1
3
 
 
buff 
50 
 
8 18 58 
 
2
3
 0 
1
3
 
 
1
2
 
1
2
 0  
buff 
 
50 
 
18 23 58 
 
5
6
 0 
1
6
 
 
2
3
 
1
3
 0 
 
buff 
 
